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The Romanian Digest: Russia’s Activities in Moldova Violate International Law

Reading Time: 16 minutesThe second argument made by the Transnistrians, linking autonomy with the right of self-determination, opens up numerous complex issues in public international law. One thing is clear: rather than a r

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New York City Bar Association’s report on the Transnistrian conflict

CONTENT:

  • Brief History of Situation
  • The Status of the TMR under International Law
  • The TMR and the Conversion of Property in Transnistria
  • Third-Party States and Secessionist Movements
  • Conclusion: Will the Fund get off the Ground

     

 
NYC Bar Report Details International Law Violations
The New York City Bar Association’s Committee on European Affairs has issued a report that says that Russia’s support of the separatist regime in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria leads to a serious claim that Russia is violating international law, and illegally interfering in the internal affairs of Moldova. The committee’s conclusion is one of the results of a year-long study that included sending a mission to the area and meeting with the leadership of both the Republic of Moldova and the so-called Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (“TMR”), as well as representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Romania and the U.S. State Department.

The Association’s Delegation to Moldova was led by our colleague, Mark A. Meyer, who is Chair of the Association’s Committee on European Affairs. The other members of the delegation were: Robert Abrams, former Attorney General of the State of New York; Barrington D. Parker, Jr., a U.S. Circuit Court Judge in the Second Circuit; Elizabeth F. Defeis, Professor of Law and former Dean of Seton Hall University Law School; and Christopher J. Borgen, Assistant Professor of Law at St. John’s University School of Law. Professor Borgen was the primary author of the report.

In preparation of the Report, the Mission met with many people including, in Moldova, President Vladimir Voronin, Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev, Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan, Minister of Reintegration Vasilii Sova, Chairperson of the Supreme Court Valeria Sterbert, Chairperson of the Constitutional Court Victor Puscas, Justice Minister Victoria Iftodi, General Ion Ursu, Chief of the Information and Security Services, leaders of all of the Parliamentary factions, US Ambassador Heather Hodges, Russian Ambassador Nicolay Ryabov, Ukrainian Ambassador Petro Cealyi, Romanian Ambassador Filip Teodorescu, OSCE Ambassador William Hill, and farmers and local municipal and county leaders from the Dubasari area; and in Transnistria, with President Igor Nikolaevich Smirnov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Grigoriy Stepanovich Marakutsa, Foreign Minister Valeriy Anatolevich Litskai, Minister of Justice Viktor Balala, and Chairperson of the Constitutional Court Vladimir Grigoriev.

The new study concludes that Russia’s activities in Transnistria – including the intervention of its 14th Army on behalf of the separatists, the ongoing military assistance to the TMR, the economic support of the TMR, and effectively bargaining on behalf of the TMR using energy and other levers of power against Moldova – lead to credible claims of state responsibility on the part of Russia for the continuing separatist crisis and its proximate results, and violates fundamental principles of international law. The New York City Bar report also maintains that the TMR’s claims for sovereignty are without merit under international law, and its sales of Moldovan state assets to mostly Russian businessmen constitute a conversion of property that is exceedingly difficult to justify under international law and in which purchasers consequently act at their own risk.

The New York City Bar report concludes that Russia has illegally propped up the viability of the TMR and made reintegration virtually impossible. The report determined that the Russians also provide materiel, expertise, and other support to the TMR on an ongoing basis. Similarly, the Soviet-era arms stockpile under control of the 14th Army has been used to support the TMR, both directly and as a source of revenue, through joint Russian-TMR sales of army materiel on the world market. Moldova wants the immediate removal of the weapons stockpiles. Russia has so far refused to remove the stockpiles (or the troops).

Besides the use of the army to either hamper the Moldovans or assist the TMR, the City Bar found that Russia has also used economic pressure and economic assistance as a carrot and stick. Economic pressure is generally not barred by international law. However, such pressure on a state, or assistance to separatists, may make the third-party state liable under the law of state responsibility if its pressure would either frustrate the pressured state’s (in this case Moldova) sovereign privileges or would breach one of the third-party’s pre-existing commitments to the state being coerced.

In considering the present situation, the report found that there are four areas of particular concern: (a) the use of energy prices as a carrot or a stick; (b) the increased use of tariff barriers against Moldovan goods; (c) economic assistance to the TMR; and (d) the shared economic interests of Russian and Transnistrian elites. Taken as a whole, the City Bar concludes that there is a significant intervention on behalf of the TMR by Russia.

The report concludes that the various activities described above – the economic pressure, the military assistance to the TMR, and the energy politics – need to be understood in light of the constant Russian rhetoric in favor of the TMR and critical of Moldova. No single activity described would likely lead to state responsibility (although the troop situation may rise to that level). The report states that these acts seen as a whole, combined with constant Russian statements supporting the TMR and criticizing Moldovan efforts at reintegration, form a compelling picture of inappropriate intervention by Russia into the domestic affairs of Moldova. Copies of the full report are also available at the New York City Bar Web site, http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/NYCity BarTransnistriaReport.pdf.


Brief History of Situation
Moldova has been entangled in a seemingly intractable separatist conflict involving ethnic tensions, Russian troops, Soviet-era arms stockpiles, smuggling, money-laundering, and corruption. Bordering Romania and Ukraine, with a majority of ethnic Romanians, it is a country that has been largely overlooked by the West. At issue is who should control a strip of land nestled between the Dniestr River and the border of Ukraine. Transnistria is less than 30 kilometers wide, with 4,118 square kilometers in total area, making it roughly the size of Rhode Island. It has a population of approximately 580,000, while the rest of Moldova has 3.36 million inhabitants. Nonetheless, Transnistria contains Moldova’s key industrial infrastructure, power plants, and, importantly, a significant stockpile of Soviet-era arms. Since 1994, it has been under the effective control of a separatist regime that calls itself the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and occupied by Russian troops.


The Status of the TMR under International Law
A central question concerns the status of the TMR under international law and, in particular, the evaluation of claims by Transnistrian leaders that the TMR has a legal right either to autonomy within Moldova or to secede.  The New York City Bar found neither claim persuasive and concluded that the TMR is best characterized as a “de facto regime.”

No Right to Autonomy.
Under international law there is no “right” to fiscal or governmental autonomy within a state. While the TMR leadership may make political arguments that one may or may not find persuasive, the report did not find a legal basis for a claim of autonomy.  The two strongest quasi-legal arguments in favor of autonomy are: (a) that due to the denunciation by the USSR of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which had established the modern boundaries of Moldova,  Transnistria should revert to an autonomous state; and, (b) self-determination as a basis for autonomy.  The denunciation argument is a chimera.  Simply denouncing a treaty does not revert the political system to the status quo ante; it merely means that the treaty will not be in force going forward.  This is especially true in treaties that include boundary delimitation provisions. The second argument made by the Transnistrians, linking autonomy with the right of self-determination, opens up numerous complex issues in public international law. One thing is clear: rather than a right to autonomy—or even a specific set of characteristics that define this term—international law in the last century has focused on the elucidation of the norm of self-determination.  Self-determination, and its relation to autonomy and secession, is discussed at greater length below. In sum, the report finds that international law has little to say as to any supposed “right” to autonomy, and that grants of “autonomy” are largely issues of domestic law. In the Transnistrian case, the Government of Moldova has proposed various plans that are effectively grants of varying levels of policymaking and regulatory autonomy; all have been rejected by the TMR.  The report concludes that, based on their words and deeds, the TMR’s leaders seem less interested in autonomy than in full sovereignty.

Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and Secession.
The norm of self-determination is not a general right of secession. It is the right of a people to decide on their culture, language, and government. It has evolved into the concepts of “internal self-determination,” the protection of minority rights within a state, and “external self-determination,” secession from a state. While self-determination is an internationally recognized principle, secession is considered a domestic issue that each state must assess itself. Influential decisions and reports concerning self-determination, such as the report concerning the status of the Aaland Islands in 1921 and the Badinter Commission opinions concerning the former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, and other examples of state practice have been consistent in the view that a successful claim for self-determination must at least show that: (a) the secessionists are a “people;” (b) the state from which they are seceding seriously violates their human rights; and (c) there are no other effective remedies under either domestic law or international law. None of these prongs are satisfied in the case of Transnistria, with the possible exception of (a). The term “people” has been generally used in recent state practice to refer to an ethnic group, or a “nation” in the classic, ethnographic, sense of the word. However there are some, such as the TMR’s leadership, who suggest the term should mean something else, perhaps a group with common goals and norms. While the norm of self-determination may evolve such that a people may be more readily identified as merely a like-minded group, we do not find that current state practice supports such a proposition. Regardless, deciding on a single definition of the term “people” is not dispositive in this case, as none of the other requirements for external self-determination are met. Concerning the second prong, the existence of serious violations of human rights, the argument of the Transnistrians can be organized into three main groupings: (a) violations of linguistic, cultural, and political rights; (b) the brutality of the 1992 War; and (c) the denial of economic rights. Taking into account the significant changes in Moldova since 1992, none of these claims is convincing today.

The actual history of Moldova since the end of the 1992 War shows that the country has improved its respect of minority rights. In contrast, the TMR has had a poor human rights record including a lack of due process, persecution of religious minorities, and retaliation against political dissenters. The 1992 War itself caused 1,000 deaths, but we found that. in light of state practice, the events of the 1992 War in and of themselves do not make a persuasive claim of secession as a legal right. If they did, the world would be rife with secessionist conflicts. Similarly, the economic rights claim, which is essentially about allocation of tax revenues, does not lead to a legal right to dismember a state.  This argument is really about policy, not the form of a polity.  Finally, the report noted that there is a general sense among commentators, opinions, and decisions, that the human rights violations that are cited in support of a claim of secession must be ongoing violations. Although Moldova still has many possible pitfalls on its road to becoming a fully modern democratic state, it is clear that it is nonetheless traveling the road in the right direction, albeit with some fits and starts. Thus, the second prong—ongoing serious violations of human rights—is not met. The third prong asks whether there are any other options available besides secession. This conflict has been frozen not so much because there are no other options under domestic and international law besides secession, but because the separatists have chosen to make the conflict seem intractable by repeatedly refusing any options short of effective sovereignty for the TMR. For example, while Moldova has sought to decrease ethnic tensions, the TMR has attempted to exacerbate them and subsequently claim that separation is necessary in order to avoid ethnic conflict and possibly genocide.  Such “gaming the system” is not persuasive. The report thus concludes that there is no solid basis for a claim of secession under external self-determination. The most basic requirements for a legal claim are not met.

The TMR as a De Facto Regime.
If Transnistria is not a state, then what is it? We considered two issues: (a) the role of recognition in the process of state formation; and (b) whether the TMR is a de facto regime. There is no obligation to recognize the TMR, even if it does have effective control of territory. Rather, it is likely that the forcible acquisition of territory, the ongoing objections by the pre-existing state, Moldova, and the evident reliance of the TMR on military, economic, and political support from Russia for its survival argue against recognition and for nonrecognition in this case. In similar cases the Security Council and/or the General Assembly call on UN member states not to recognize such seceding entities.  Inasmuch as the TMR has effective control over Transnistria but is not recognized, the TMR can best be understood by using the doctrine of de facto regimes. Such de facto regimes are treated as partial subjects of international law. Their unique status does give rise to certain rights and responsibilities, primarily related to acts required for the support and well-being of the population. It may conclude agreements that are held at a status below treaties. Besides the right to act in order to support its population, a de facto regime may also be held responsible for breaches of international law. While the de facto regime thus has certain rights and responsibilities, the acts of de facto regimes have uncertain legal effect. Acts of such a regime may become invalid with the disappearance of the regime, for instance, if the territory is reabsorbed into the parent state. However, the reintegrated state after a failed de facto regime may be held liable for the acts of the de facto regime that were part of the normal administration of the territory based on the assumption that such acts were neutral and that the state would probably have undertaken similar such acts.  If, on the other hand, the de facto regime becomes a state, then its acts will be binding on the new state.

 
The TMR and the Conversion of Property in Transnistria
At the heart of the dispute between the Government of Moldova and the TMR’s leadership is the issue of the control of the economic assets of Transnistria.  Does the TMR have the right to convert the property in its area of effective control?  If the two parts of Moldova are reintegrated, must these decisions of the TMR be respected? The report used two theoretical frameworks to answer these questions.  The first, the concept of de facto regime, was discussed above.  The second is an analogy to the international law of the administration of occupied territories, the most complete statement of which is found in the Fourth Geneva Convention.  The report used these rules only by analogy as one might argue that the TMR actually is not bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention.  Nonetheless, the New York City Bar found the rules concerning the administration of occupied territories and those concerning de facto regimes to be useful, especially as they are also remarkably consistent as they both draw from the same root concepts of property rights that tap all the way down to the Roman law of usufruct, use of property by one who does not own that asset. Applying the international law of de facto regimes, the TMR does not have the right to sell-off Moldovan state assets or any private property.  Any such sales face possible challenge and repudiation should Transnistria become reintegrated into Moldova. By not only applying the conception of the TMR as a de facto regime, but also by analogizing to the international law of the administration of occupied territories, the City Bar found that an occupying power or its analog: (a) may confiscate state property, other than real property, if it is usable for military purposes or in the administration of the territory; (b) may only administer non-military state real property without destroying or otherwise converting the economic value of the property; and (c) may not confiscate private property unless it is war materiel. Based on the foregoing, the TMR’s privatization program is thus exceedingly difficult to justify. Any private party taking part in this program as a purchaser consequently does so at its own risk.


Third-Party States and Secessionist Movements
The third and final main legal issue the New York City Bar considered was the role of “third-party” states. States have a basic duty not to intervene or otherwise interfere with the resolution of an internal conflict within another state. Under circumstances where self-determination or, more clearly, external self-determination is implicated, or where the Security Council finds that a conflict has become a threat to international peace, then third-party states may have more freedom of action concerning the conflict. This fundamental norm of non-intervention is linked with concepts of sovereignty, self-determination, and peaceful coexistence. The role of third-party states is especially important in this case as Russia and Ukraine have taken on the role of “guarantor” states, states that have a special interest in ensuring an end to the conflict and formally commit to devoting resources to conflict resolution.  Being a guarantor puts a state into a position in which it becomes involved in an ongoing crisis in another country, but that state must nonetheless respect international law in its actions. The report considered the actions of Russia and Ukraine in light of these rules of conduct.

Russia
Russia, not least because it maintains troops in Transnistria, is not only a guarantor, but a key player in the conflict.  The City Bar considered four main issues:  (a) the activities of the Russian Army and other organs of the Russian Federation in Transnistria; (b) economic pressure by the Russian Federation on Moldova; (c) ties between the TMR leadership and Russian leadership; and (d) the general diplomatic stance of the Russian Federation. The role of the Russian Army can be split into two phases: assistance during the 1992 War and ongoing activities, including maintenance of arms stockpiles in Transnistria. The Russian 14th Army played a decisive role in the 1992 War by intervening in the fighting on behalf of the separatists.  Despite treaty promises to demobilize and repeated Moldovan requests that Russia remove its troops from Transnistria, the troops remain. Consequently, they prop up the viability of the TMR and make reintegration more difficult. They also provide materiel, expertise, and other support to the TMR on an ongoing basis. Similarly, the Soviet-era arms stockpile under control of the 14th Army has been used to support the TMR both directly and as a source of revenue through joint Russian-TMR sales of army materiel on the world market.   Moldova thus wants the immediate removal of the weapons stockpiles. Russia has so far refused to remove the stockpiles (or the troops) until there is a comprehensive political settlement and has also argued that the Transnistrians will not let them remove the arms.

Besides the use of the army to either hamper the Moldovans or assist the TMR, the second main issue is that Russia has also used economic pressure and economic assistance as a carrot and stick. Economic pressure is generally not barred by international law. However, such pressure on a state or assistance to separatists may make the third-party state liable under the law of state responsibility if its pressure would either frustrate Moldova’s sovereign privileges or would breach one of the third-party state’s pre-existing commitments to Moldova.  In considering the present situation, there are four areas of particular interest: (a) the use of energy prices as a carrot or a stick; (b) the increased use of tariff barriers against Moldovan goods; (c) economic assistance to the TMR; and (d) the shared economic interests of Russian and Transnistrian elites. Taken as a whole, there is a significant intervention on behalf of the TMR. On the third issue, the ties between TMR and Russian leadership, there is ample circumstantial evidence. Smirnov, Minister of Justice Balala, and Chief of Internal Security Vladimir Antufeyev all arrived in Moldova at the start or since the start of the separatist crisis.  The TMR’s ruling elite is largely Russian and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian, and have Russian citizenship. They have been granted Russian nationality.  Certain members came to the TMR from senior positions in the Russian government, particularly the Russian parliament (the “Duma”) and the Russian Army. Finally, the various activities described above—the economic pressure, the military assistance to the TMR, the energy politics—need to be understood in light of the constant Russian rhetoric in favor of the TMR and critical of Moldova. While the report does not contend that any single activity described could lead to state responsibility (although the troop situation may rise to that level) the New York City Bar believes that these acts seen as a whole, combined with constant Russian statements supporting the TMR and criticizing Moldovan efforts at reintegration, form a compelling picture of inappropriate intervention by Russia into the domestic affairs of Moldova.

 Ukraine
Due to its common border with Moldova—and particularly with Transnistria—as well as the significant ethnic Ukrainian population in Transnistria and throughout Moldova, Ukraine is a key stakeholder in the Transnistrian conflict. Ukraine has been critical of Transnistrian separatism and has advocated the complete withdrawal of Russian troops, but has also been perceived (rightly or wrongly) as allowing smuggling through its territory and possibly being open to relations with the TMR. Although Ukraine has acted in many ways as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Transnistria, its attentions have often been viewed by the Moldovans with a mixture of hope and suspicion.  Ukraine has made what may be a good faith effort at plotting a path towards a solution of the crisis; however an actual final plan needs to be seen before its legal implications can be assessed. The stricter border controls that are currently being implemented are a necessary, though not conclusive, step in resolving the Transnistrian crisis.  Now that Ukraine has become a more active participant in the Transnistrian crisis, its actions will need to be monitored, as have those of Russia and Moldova, by the various stakeholders.


Conclusion: Will the Fund get off the Ground?
Concerning the Status of the TMR. Attempted secessions are largely viewed as domestic affairs that need to be resolved by the state itself. There is no right to secede as a general matter. At most, secessions may be accepted in cases where a people have been oppressed and there is no other option for the protection of their human rights. In light of these rules, the TMR has not made a legally sufficient case that it has a right to external self-determination or secession. Consequently, the effective control of the TMR of the Transnistrian part of Moldova is that of a de facto regime and may be viewed as analogous to control by an occupying power.  The TMR is thus limited as to what it may legally do with the territory it administers.

Concerning the Conversion of Property by the TMR. The law of occupation recognizes that the occupying power may, as a matter of fact, control the economic resources within a territory but, as a matter of law, the rightful owners are the previous owners.  The final disposition of the property is not decided by the current effective control by the occupier and as such, the occupier has the legal duty not to destroy the economic value of the property. Any economic activities undertaken jointly with the separatists or insurgents by another party are at the peril of that party.  There is no comfort that such activities will be sanctioned after the final resolution of the separatist conflict and they may, in fact, be “unwound.” In light of the rules governing de facto regimes and also the law of occupation, the TMR’s privatization program can leave investors with no confidence that these transactions would be enforced if the TMR is reintegrated into Moldova.

 Concerning the Responsibilities of Third-Party States. Interventions by third parties are not favored and are assessed in relation to the norms of non-intervention set out in numerous global and regional treaties and legal documents. Sovereignty requires that a state’s wishes concerning affairs within its own territory be respected up to the point that some other core interest of the international system is implicated.  Thus, for example, the garrisoning of troops on foreign soil is not allowed if the host state requests that the troops leave. Russia’s activities concerning the Transnistrian situation, particularly the intervention of the 14th Army on behalf of the separatists, the ongoing military assistance to the TMR, the economic support of the TMR, and effectively bargaining on behalf of the TMR using energy process and other levers of power against Moldova, leads to credible claims of state responsibility on the part of Russia for the continuing separatist crisis and its proximate results. Similarly, in light of the experience with Russia, Ukraine’s increased participation in the conflict should be monitored.


Editors Note: It is our policy not to mention our clients by name in The Romanian Digest™ or discuss their business unless it is a matter of public record and our clients approve. The information herein is correct to the best of our knowledge and belief at press time. Specific advice should be sought from us, however, before investment or other decisions are made.

Copyright 2006 Rubin Meyer Doru & Trandafir, societate civila de avocati. All rights reserved. No part of The Romanian Digest™ may be reproduced, reused or redistributed in any form without prior written permission from the publisher.

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FC Sheriff Tiraspol victory: can national pride go hand in hand with political separatism?

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A new football club has earned a leading place in the UEFA Champions League groups and starred in the headlines of worldwide football news yesterday. The Football Club Sheriff Tiraspol claimed a win with the score 2-1 against Real Madrid on the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium in Madrid. That made Sheriff Tiraspol the leader in Group D of the Champions League, including the football club in the groups of the most important European interclub competition for the first time ever.

International media outlets called it a miracle, a shock and a historic event, while strongly emphasizing the origin of the team and the existing political conflict between the two banks of the Dniester. “Football club from a pro-Russian separatist enclave in Moldova pulls off one of the greatest upsets in Champions League history,” claimed the news portals. “Sheriff crushed Real!” they said.

Moldovans made a big fuss out of it on social media, splitting into two groups: those who praised the team and the Republic of Moldova for making history and those who declared that the football club and their merits belong to Transnistria – a problematic breakaway region that claims to be a separate country.

Both groups are right and not right at the same time, as there is a bunch of ethical, political, social and practical matters that need to be considered.

Is it Moldova?

First of all, every Moldovan either from the right or left bank of Dniester (Transnistria) is free to identify himself with this achievement or not to do so, said Vitalie Spranceana, a sociologist, blogger, journalist and urban activist. According to him, boycotting the football club for being a separatist team is wrong.

At the same time, “it’s an illusion to think that territory matters when it comes to football clubs,” Spranceana claimed. “Big teams, the ones included in the Champions League, have long lost their connection both with the countries in which they operate, and with the cities in which they appeared and to which they linked their history. […] In the age of globalized commercial football, teams, including the so-called local ones, are nothing more than global traveling commercial circuses, incidentally linked to cities, but more closely linked to all sorts of dirty, semi-dirty and cleaner cash flows.”

What is more important in this case is the consistency, not so much of citizens, as of politicians from the government who have “no right to celebrate the success of separatism,” as they represent “the national interests, not the personal or collective pleasures of certain segments of the population,” believes the political expert Dionis Cenusa. The victory of FC Sheriff encourages Transnistrian separatism, which receives validation now, he also stated.

“I don’t know how it happens that the “proud Moldovans who chose democracy”, in their enthusiasm for Sheriff Tiraspol’s victory over Real Madrid, forget the need for total and unconditional withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria!” declared the journalist Vitalie Ciobanu.

Nowadays, FC Sheriff Tiraspol has no other choice than to represent Moldova internationally. For many years, the team used the Moldovan Football Federation in order to be able to participate in championships, including international ones. That is because the region remains unrecognised by the international community. However, the club’s victory is presented as that of Transnistria within the region, without any reference to the Republic of Moldova, its separatist character being applied in this case especially.

Is it a victory?

In fact, FC Sheriff Tiraspol joining the Champions League is a huge image breakthrough for the Transnistrian region, as the journalist Madalin Necsutu claimed. It is the success of the Tiraspol Club oligarchic patrons. From the practical point of view, FC Sheriff Tiraspol is a sports entity that serves its own interests and the interests of its owners, being dependent on the money invested by Tiraspol (but not only) oligarchs.

Here comes the real dilemma: the Transnistrian team, which is generously funded by money received from corruption schemes and money laundering, is waging an unequal fight with the rest of the Moldovan football clubs, the journalist also declared. The Tiraspol team is about to raise 15.6 million euro for reaching the Champions League groups and the amounts increase depending on their future performance. According to Necsutu, these money will go directly on the account of the club, not to the Moldovan Football Federation, creating an even bigger gab between FC Sheriff and other football clubs from Moldova who have much more modest financial possibilities.

“I do not see anything useful for Moldovan football, not a single Moldovan player is part of FC Sheriff Tiraspol. I do not see anything beneficial for the Moldovan Football Federation or any national team.”

Is it only about football?

FC Sheriff Tiraspol, with a total estimated value of 12.8 million euros, is controlled by Victor Gusan and Ilya Kazmala, being part of Sheriff Holding – a company that controls the trade of wholesale, retail food, fuels and medicine by having monopolies on these markets in Transnistria. The holding carries out car trading activities, but also operates in the field of construction and real estate. Gusan’s people also hold all of the main leadership offices in the breakaway region, from Parliament to the Prime Minister’s seat or the Presidency.

The football club is supported by a holding alleged of smuggling, corruption, money laundering and organised crime. Moldovan media outlets published investigations about the signals regarding the Sheriff’s holding involvement in the vote mobilization and remuneration of citizens on the left bank of the Dniester who participated in the snap parliamentary elections this summer and who were eager to vote for the pro-Russian socialist-communist bloc.

Considering the above, there is a great probability that the Republic of Moldova will still be represented by a football club that is not identified as being Moldovan, being funded from obscure money, growing in power and promoting the Transnistrian conflict in the future as well.

Photo: unknown

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Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita meets high-ranking EU officials in Brussels

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Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Natalia Gavrilita, together with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu, pay an official visit to Brussels, between September 27-28, being invited by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles.

Today, Prime Minister had a meeting with Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The Moldovan PM thanked the senior European official for the support of the institution in strengthening democratic processes, reforming the judiciary and state institutions, economic recovery and job creation, as well as increasing citizens’ welfare. Natalia Gavrilita expressed her confidence that the current visit laid the foundations for boosting relations between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union, so that, in the next period, it would be possible to advance high-level dialogues on security, justice and energy. Officials also exchanged views on priorities for the Eastern Partnership Summit, to be held in December.

“The EU is open to continue to support the Republic of Moldova and the ambitious reform agenda it proposes. Moldova is an important and priority partner for us,” said Charles Michel.

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also met with Paolo Gentiloni, European Commissioner for Economy, expressing her gratitude for the support received through the OMNIBUS macro-financial assistance program. The two officials discussed the need to advance the recovery of money from bank fraud, to strengthen sustainable mechanisms for supporting small and medium-sized enterprises in Moldova, and to standardize the customs and taxes as one of the main conditions for deepening cooperation with the EU in this field.

Additionally, Prime Minister spoke about the importance of the Eastern Partnership and the Deep Free Trade Agreement, noting that the Government’s policies are aimed at developing an economic model aligned with the European economic model, focused on digitalization, energy efficiency and the green economy.

A common press release of the Moldovan Prime Minister with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell Fontelles, took place today, where the agenda of Moldova’s reforms and the main priorities to focus on in the coming months were presented: judiciary reform; fighting COVID-19 pandemic; promoting economic recovery and conditions for growth and job creation; strengthening state institutions and resilience of the country.

“I am here to relaunch the dialogue between my country and the European Union. Our partnership is strong, but I believe there is room for even deeper cooperation and stronger political, economic and sectoral ties. I am convinced that this partnership is the key to the prosperity of our country and I hope that we will continue to strengthen cooperation.”

The Moldovan delegation met Didier Reynders, European Commissioner for Justice. Tomorrow, there are scheduled common meetings with Oliver Varhelyi, European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Adina Valean, European Commissioner for Transport and Kadri Simson, European Commissioner for Energy.

Prime Minister will also attend a public event, along with Katarina Mathernova, Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.

Photo: gov.md

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Promo-LEX about Maia Sandu’s UN speech: The president must insist on appointing a rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Transnistria

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The President of the Republic of Moldova, Maia Sandu, pays an official visit to New York, USA, between September 21-22. There, she participates in the work of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a press release of the President’s Office, the official will deliver a speech at the tribune of the United Nations.

In this context, the Promo-LEX Association suggested the president to request the appointment of a special rapporteur in order to monitor the situation of human rights in the Transnistrian region. According to Promo-LEX, the responsibility for human rights violations in the Transnistrian region arises as a result of the Russian Federation’s military, economic and political control over the Tiraspol regime.

“We consider it imperative to insist on the observance of the international commitments assumed by the Russian Federation regarding the withdrawal of the armed forces and ammunition from the territory of the country,” the representatives of Promo-LEX stated. They consider the speech before the UN an opportunity “to demand the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Russian Federation with reference to this territory which is in its full control.”

“It is important to remember about the numerous cases of murder, torture, ill-treatment, forced enlistment in illegal military structures, the application of pseudo-justice in the Transnistrian region, all carried out under the tacit agreement of the Russian Federation. These findings stem from dozens of rulings and decisions issued by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that Russia is responsible for human rights violations in the region.”

The association representatives expressed their hope that the president of the country would give priority to issues related to the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region and would call on relevant international actors to contribute to guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms throughout Moldova.

They asked Maia Sandu to insist on the observance of the obligation to evacuate the ammunition and the military units of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, to publicly support the need for the Russian Federation to implement the ECtHR rulings on human rights violations in the Transnistrian region, and to request the appointment of an UN Human Rights Council special rapporteur  to monitor the human rights situation in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

**

The Promo-LEX Association concluded that 14 out of 25 actions planned within the National Action Plan for the years 2018–2022 concerning respecting human rights in Transnistria were not carried out by the responsible authorities.

The association expressed its concern and mentioned that there are a large number of delays in the planned results. “There is a lack of communication and coordination between the designated institutions, which do not yet have a common vision of interaction for the implementation of the plan.”

Promo-LEX requested the Government of the Republic of Moldova to re-assess the reported activities and to take urgent measures, “which would exclude superficial implementation of future activities and increase the level of accountability of the authorities.”

Photo: peacekeeping.un.org

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